









Protection against refoulement from Europe: human rights 




Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter 
 





This is a copy of a paper originally published in International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 48 (3). pp. 515-544, July 1999.  
 
© Cambridge University Press [1999] 
 






The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster 
aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience.  
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial private 
study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from within this 
archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch. 
(http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail wattsn@wmin.ac.uk. 
PROTECTION AGAINST REFOULEMENT FROM EUROPE:
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW COMES TO THE RESCUE
HELENE LAMBERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing opinion has appeared in refugee and human rights discourse
that the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (the European Convention) provides more extensive protec-
tion against refoulement than the 1951 UN Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention). However, uncertainties
remain as to whether the protection offered by the 1984 UN Convention
against Torture (the Torture Convention) and the 1966 UN International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Political Covenant) may
substitute, or, rather, reinforce, that of the European Convention. Which
of these four instruments offers the greatest protection against a decision
of refoulement from a European country? The answer to this question is
far from being academic. The rule that an international organ may only be
competent to consider an individual petition or communication provided
"the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of
individual investigation or settlement" is embodied in all three instru-
ments providing a procedure for individual complaints. It is therefore
crucial for an asylum-seeker to give his or her best shot first, even if, as
rightly pointed out by Liz Heffernan, the Strasbourg organs and the
Geneva organs are not in competition.1 This article will review the scope
of protection afforded under the three of these treaties which provide an
international enforcement mechanism to persons who have sought
refugee status in the domestic jurisdiction.
Refoulement describes the act of returning a person to a country where
he or she fears for his or her life or freedom on grounds of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
The principle of non-refoulement is part of the right (not) to return
recognised to everyone by international law. In situations where an
individual is unwilling to return, States' authorities must verify that no
obstacles exist to the return of the individual to his or her country of origin
• Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter. I wish to thank John Bridge for his helpful
comments, Salvatore Lombardo for providing me with some useful information, and
Marie-Odile Wiederkehr for arranging my stay as a visiting academic at the Council of
Europe during summer 1997.
1. See L. Heffernan, "A Comparative View of Individual Petition Procedures under the
European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights" (1997) 19 H.R.Q. 78-112, at p.112.
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before exercising their power to depart or expel. Protection against
refoulement is thus closely related to protection against torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment.
While there is no European instrument explicitly prohibiting refoule-
ment, Article 3 of the European Convention has been construed as also
covering such a prohibition. As early as 1965, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe recognised that "Article 3 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms . . . , by
prohibiting inhuman treatment, binds contracting parties not to return
refugees to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened".2
Of more direct legal consequence is the ruling by the European Court of
Human Rights, in the case of Chahal v. United Kingdom, that the
"protection afforded by Article 3 is ... wider than that provided by
Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees".3
The system of protection offered by the Refugee Convention is distinct
from that offered under the other three instruments which have an
international enforcement mechanism for at least four reasons. First, it
relies on the power of the judiciary in each member State to interpret the
provisions of the Convention. Second, it is limited to persons recognised
as refugees under the Convention (and the definition is restrictive) and to
asylum-seekers who are awaiting a decision on their refugee status.4
Third, it provides derogations to the principle of non-refoulement in time
of war but also where the applicant has committed some serious crime.
Fourth, it provides no mechanism of enforcement. In contrast, the
European Convention offers considerable advantages over the Refugee
Convention to persons not formally recognised as refugees against return
to a country where they would fear for their security. Article 3 of the
European Convention is absolute and unconditional. Moreover, it
applies to everyone, even illegal entrants, whatever their activities or
personal conduct.5 The individual does not need to be a citizen of a
contracting party, or need to be inside the territory of a contracting State.6
Finally, the European Convention provides a mechanism of enforcement.
Thus, the European Convention appears to be more extensive in scope
than the Refugee Convention, but is it the best one to offer protection
against refoulement for asylum-seekers in particular? Indeed, if the recent
2. Recommendation 434 "Concerning the granting of the right of asylum to European
refugees".
3. 15 Nov. 1996, Reports of Judg. and Dec. (1996-V) No.22, para.80.
4. See M.-O. Wiederkehr, "L'oeuvre du Conseil de I'Europe dans Ie domaine du droit
de l'asile et des r£fugies", paper presented at the Colloque de la Socidte Francaise pour le
Droit International (1996), pp.12-13 (unpublished).
5. Chahal v. United Kingdom, supra n.3. D. v. United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, Reports of
Judg. and Dec. (1997-111) NoJ7.
6. Soering v. United Kingdom, 7 July 1989 Ser. A, No.161.
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case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows some interesting
developments, in the sense that its jurisdiction is quite liberal, its overall
jurisprudence remains restrictive with regard to asylum-seekers. As this
article discusses, the standard of evidential requirements is set incredibly
high and, as a result, can rarely be met in cases involving asylum-seekers.
Moreover, the backlog of applications may convince some asylum-
seekers to look for alternatives. It is, therefore, essential to examine the
existence of any other options and to assess the suitability of such
alternative instruments for asylum-seekers. Two such option s exist, both
of which are provided by global instruments. First, asylum-seekers can
lodge a petition to the Convention against Torture Committee (Torture
Committee) set up under the Torture Convention. Or, and this is the
second option, individuals can bring a complaint to the Human Rights
Committee established under the Political Covenant. Both Committees
are based in Geneva. As more and more European States have now
ratified these instruments, such options are becoming increasingly
attractive.7
On the basis of a comparative study of the key elements of the
individual complaints procedures under the European Convention, the
Torture Convention, and the Political Covenant, this article examines
the practical advantages and disadvantages that each mechanism may
offer to an asylum-seeker in Europe.8This article focuses on international
proceedings.9 It concludes that the most generous protection against
refoulement from Europe lies in the development of the case law of the
7. On 1 Jan. 1998, the European Convention was binding on 39 European States, all of
which had recognised the right of individual petition under Art.25 and the jurisdiction of the
Court under Art.46. The Refugee Convention was binding on 131 States, including all the
signatories to the European Convention with the exception of Andorra and San Marino.
The Torture Convention was binding on 103 States, including all the signatories to the
European Convention except four, i.e. Andorra, Belgium, Ireland and San Marino. Of these
35 States, Albania, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania,
the UK and Ukraine had not recognised the competence of the Torture Committee to
receive individuals' complaints. The Political Covenant was binding on 140 States, including
all the signatories to the European Convention, except three, i.e. Andorra, Liechtenstein
and Turkey. Of these 36 States, Albania, Switzerland and the UK are not a party to the
Optional Protocol.
8. Provisions relating to the right to life, unlawful detention, family life, education,
' freedom of association and expression, though relevant to the issue of expulsion of
asylum-seekers, remain outside the scope of this article. For reasons of space, this article
focuses exclusively on refoulement from Europe. The right to family life is explored in H.
Lambert, "The European Court of Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and Other
Persons in Need of Protection to Family Reunion" (1999) I J.R.L. (July, Vol. 11, No.3). On
unlawful detention see C Giakoumopoulos, "Detention of Asylum Seekers in the Light of
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights", in J. Hughes and F. Liebaut
(Eds), Detention of Asylum Seekers in Europe: Analysis and Perspectives (1998),
pp.161-182.
9. Given space constraints, it does not offer a systematic treatment of the application of
the Refugee Convention in European States. For such a treatment, see H. Lambert, Seeking
Asylum: Comparative Law and Practice in Selected European Countries (1995).
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European Court of Human Rights, in particular with regard to proceed-
ings based on Article 3.
Finally, two points may be made about the timeliness of this article. In
the last five years, the European Court of Human Rights has dealt with an
increasing number of cases of expulsion under Article 3 of the European
Convention. The result seems to be a more liberal jurisprudence.
Previous conclusions on the subject need, therefore, to be revisited in the
light of recent judgments and also of Protocol XI to the European
Convention.10 Similarly, more cases of refoulement, expulsion and
deportation have come to the attention of the Geneva Committees.
Hence, the need to concentrate on the findings of these Committees and
to apply them to a specific contest, i.e. non-refoulement.u
Taking the perspective of an asylum-seeker, this article addresses four
questions to determine which instrument provides best protection from
refoulement from Europe. Who is covered by the provisions relating to
non-refoulementl What are the admissibility requirements? What kinds
of ill-treatment in the country of destination may provide grounds for
claiming protection from refoulementl And what are the evidentiary
requirements? Before answering each of these questions in turn, the
substantial provisions prohibiting torture as a means of preventing
refoulement will be discussed.
II. SUBSTANTIAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING TORTURE AS MEANS OF
PREVENTING REFOULEMENT FROM EUROPE
NON-REFOULEMENT is the principle upon which the system of legal
protection of refugees rests. It has become a peremptory norm of
international human rights law, as demonstrated by its endorsement in
two UN instruments, the Refugee Convention (Article 33) and the
Torture Convention (Article 3).12 Furthermore, Article 7 of the Political
10. See, in particular, the excellent study by W. Suntinger, "The Principle of Non-
Refoulement: Looking Rather to Geneva than to Strasbourg" (1995) 49 Austrian J.
Pub.Int.L. 203-225. Protocol XI entered into force on 1 Nov. 1998.
11. Apart from Suntinger's article (ibid), interesting comparative elements may be found
in two othei articles, Heffernan, op. cit. supra n.l, at pp.78-112, and O. Andrysek, "Gaps in
International Protection and the Potential for Redress through Individual Complaints
Procedures" (1997) 91 J.R.L. 392-414. Among the vast literature on individual instruments,
see in particular the works by M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—CCPR
Commentary (1993), D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the
Development of the 1CCPR (1991), G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law
(1996), and Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights in Context (1996).
12. 189 U.N.T.S. 150 and UNGA Res39/46 of 10 Dec. 1984, respectively.
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Covenant and Article 3 of the European Convention has been inter-
preted to encompass this prohibition.11
In the language of protection, it does not really matter whether
protection against refoulement is provided under the Refugee Conven-
tion or under principles of human rights law, so long as it is effective.
Refugee law is often recognised to be part of human rights law. However,
considerations on refoulement or torture, by the Geneva Committees or
Strasbourg organs do not constitute a decision on refugee status. Thus,
the distinction between the two systems of legal norms becomes
important regarding the determination of refugee status because the
Refugee Convention alone creates a status which is recognised in
domestic law.14
Refoulement refers to the expulsion, deportation, removal, extradition,
sending back, return or rejection of a person from a country to the
frontiers of a territory where there exists a danger of ill-treatment, i.e.
persecution, torture or inhuman treatment. Of the four instruments, the
Refugee Convention is the only one which does not provide an absolute
and unconditional guarantee against refoulement.15 Protection from
refoulement under the Refugee Convention is limited on two grounds:
danger to the security of the country in which the refugee is, or, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, a
refugee constitutes a danger to the community of that country (Article
33(2)). In addition, Article IF excludes from the benefit of the whole
Convention any person whom there are serious reasons for considering
has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to admission to that country of refuge, or has been found guilty of
13. UNGA Res.2200 A (XXI) and E.T.S. No.5, respectively. Outside the scope of these
provisions, the expulsion of a refugee lawfully in a territory is explicitly prohibited by Art.32
of the Refugee Convention and Art.13 of the Political Covenant. In addition, Art.4,
Protocol 4 to the European Convention prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens. As for
refugees unlawfully in a territory, they are covered by Art.31 of the Refugee Convention (as
far as penalties, not including expulsion, are concerned) and ArtJ3 (as far as refoulement is
concerned).
14. In Ahmed v. Austria (17 Dec. 1996, Reports of Judg. and Dec. (1996-VI) No.26), the
E.Ct.H.R. considered that it was not competent to ask Austria to grant Mr Ahmed a
residence permit (the Torture Committee made a similar statement in P.L.Q. v. Canada,
Communication No.57/1996, 17 Nov. 1997). Following the Court's judgment, Austria
refused to grant Ahmed a residence permit, thereby denying him the right to work (he
committed suicide on 15 Mar. 1998). See also the separate opinion of Mr Cabral Barreto to
the European Commission of H.R.'s report on the case B.B. v. France, Application
No.30930/96,9 Mar. 1998), in which he explains that, as far as he is concerned, an alien who is
"forced" to live in a country without any "protection soriale", would be facing treatment
contrary to Art.3.
15. It is nevertheless subject to no reservation (Art42).
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acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.16
Moreover, because of the particular nature of asylum, most asylum-
seekers qualifying for protection against refoulement do so on a dis-
cretionary basis. No such limitations exist in the European Convention,
the Torture Convention or the Political Covenant. Both Article 3 of the
European Convention and Article 7 of the Political Covenant are subject
to no derogation.17 The absolute, but also unconditional, character of
Article 3 was emphasised by the Court in the case of Ireland v. United
Kingdom.18 it was reaffirmed unequivocally in Chahal v. United King-
dom.19 In contrast, the Torture Convention, though prohibiting both
torture and refoulement in absolute terms, limits non-refoulement solely
to cases of torture.20 Thus, while a State may be authorised to expel an
alien under the Refugee Convention, in order to protect the national
community against a serious danger, it is nevertheless required to respect
its legal obligations under these other treaties, i.e. Article 3 of the
European Convention, Article 3 of the Torture Convention and Article 7
of the Political Covenant.
Protection against refoulement under the Refugee Convention may be
supervised and enforced only by judicial and/or administrative authori-
ties at the national level. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) can do no more than ask States to change their
differing practices.21 In contrast, the judicial mechanisms for supervising
and enforcing protection against refoulement are more uniform under the
other treaties under analysis. Individual complaints are clearly only one
aspect of the work of the Geneva Committees; another, perhaps more
important, aspect is the examination of States' reports and, where
16. There are still doubts as to whether or not terrorist activities constitute "acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the UN" under Art.lF(b), despite the large support
recently given to the view that such activities may give rise to actions based on Chapter VII
of the Charter (see M. N. Shaw, International Law (1997) pp.805-806). Serious questions
also arise concerning the political or non-political character of terrorist activities (McMullen
v. I.N.S. 788 F.2d 591, 597 (U.S.C.A., 9th Cir. 1986)). In the UK the House of Lords ruled
that Art.lF(b) applied to an asylum-seeker, Mr Tilmatine, allegedly found guilty of a
terrorist attack in Algeria, his country of origin, thereby recognising the non-political
character of terrorist activities (7. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All
E.R. 865). In Canada, however, the Supreme Court decided that in the absence of any
indication in international law designating drug trafficking as an act contrary to the purposes
and principles of the UN, drug trafficking cannot amount to an exclusion clause (Migration
News Sheet, June 1997, p.7).
17. Art.l5(2) and Art.4(2), respectively.
18. The Court explicitly stated that "the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct". If
further held that "Article 3 makes no provision for exception... there can be no derogation
therefrom even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation" ((1978)
25 E.Q.H.R., Ser.A, para.65).
19. Supra n3.
20. Arts.2 and 3. Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No.13/1993, 27 Apr. 1994.
21. Preamble to the Refugee Convention and Art.35 and 36 of the Convention.
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provided, the possibility of further enquiries, including visits to the State's
territory. This is not true of the European Convention, which offers a
sophisticated and indeed complex system for dealing with inter-State and
individual complaint but a rather limited procedure for examining State
reports.22The latter was nevertheless complemented with an advanced
system for carrying out State inspections under the 1987 European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. Under all three instruments, examination of
individual complaints takes place in two stages: the admissibility stage
and the merits stage. In Geneva, both stages are dealt with before a single
organ. In Strasbourg, until the reform introduced by Protocol XI, the
admissibility stage was taking place before the European Commission of
Human Rights and the merits stage before the European Court of Human
Rights.23 These two organs have since been replaced by a single one, the
new European Court of Human Rights, which has compulsory jurisdic-
tion.24 This state of affairs, combined with the fact that the Strasbourg
institutions started work long before either of the Committees, has
resulted in the use by the Commission and Court of sophisticated criteria
to decide cases and in a body of cases that the Human Rights Committee
or the Torture Committee can simply not equal.
As far as enforcement is concerned, the Human Rights Committee and
the Torture Committee offer limited scope. Neither Committee has legal
means to enforce its "views".2* In contrast, judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights are legally binding and their execution is
22. Art.52 (old Art.57), European Convention. The creation of the Secretary General's
Monitoring Unit of the Council of Europe reveals the concern of the institution for
improving the supervision of the compliance by the member States with their commitments
under the Convention.
23. The Court could nevertheless, in exceptional circumstances, use its powers to review
the facts established by the Commission (Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 Mar. 1991, Ser. A,
No.201).
24. Arts.33-34 (old Arts.24-25), European Convention. The new Court was inaugurated
on 3 Nov. 1998. The Committee of Ministers will continue to fulfil its supervision role
(Art46, old ArL54).
25. Committees are not courts; they are of a non-judicial character and, therefore, they do
not issue judgments but views which have no legal but, rather, moral authority. Michael
O'Flaherty nevertheless notes that "since 1994, the [Human Rights] Committee has
implicitly suggested in its Views on individual communications that the decisions of the
Committee are of a binding nature" (see O'Flaherty, Human Rights and the UN—Practice
Before the Treaty Bodies (1996), p.47, n.68). McGoldriclc's assessment of the Human Rights
Committee's work on Art.7, however, is highly critical. He describes the final views of the
Committee as "often unhelpful, incomprehensible, or ambiguous" and goes as far as
accusing the Committee of "arbitrariness in its findings". He notices the lack of co-operation
between States, which persist in violating Art.7, and the Committee, and the lack of publicity
of the Committee's views. He recognises that there is as yet no proof that States are
following the Committee's recommendations. Finally, he concludes by stating that the views
of the Committee "have only been of marginal significance in terms of effective human
rights protection" (see McGoldrick, op. cit supra n.ll, at p.381).
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supervised by the Committee of Ministers.26 Finally, two developments
lead us to conclude that the gap between Strasbourg and Geneva is
closing rather than deepening. First, the practice of States shows that the
views of the Torture Committee are being complied with.27 Second, a
Special Rapporteur was appointed, in 1990, and a procedure created to
follow up the views of the Human Rights Committee.28
III. WHO IS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO
NON-REFO ULEMENT!
THE scope rationepersonae is considerably limited under Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention. In order to benefit from the principle of non-
refoulement, the person must be a refugee, or at least an asylum-seeker
awaiting for a decision on refugee status.29 The UNHCR defines "rejected
asylum-seekers" as persons who are not in need of international
protection but recognises the danger of this definition where too often
persons who are refused the status of refugee remain nevertheless in need
of protection. This is particularly the case, notes the UNHCR, of
asylum-seekers rejected by application of the principle of "safe third
country" or for reasons of national security.30 In addition, recent instances
reveal that the bad faith of any asylum-seeker has been used as evidence
against the grant of refugee status by national authorities outside the
scope of credible risk of persecution.31 No such distinction between
refugees or asylum-seekers awaiting a decision on their status and
rejected asylum-seekers unlawfully in the country applies with regard to
the other three instruments. Everyone is protected irrespective of
conduct, nationality or citizenship under Article 3 of the European
Convention, Article 3 of the Torture Convention and Article 7 of the
Political Covenant.32 The unconditional character of the prohibition of
26. Art.46 (old Arts.46 and 54), European Convention. This is not the case, however, for
reports adopted by the Commission or decisions adopted by the Committee of Ministers
where the case is not referred to the Court (old Art32).
27. See Andrysek, op. cit. supra n.ll, at pp.402-414.
28. Rule of Procedure 95 of the Human Rights Committee.
29. Recommendation No.R(84)l relating to the Protection of Persons who Fulfils the
Condition of the Geneva Convention but Who are not Formally Recognized as Refugees
nevertheless provides that the principle of non-refoulement applies to all persons who have a
well-founded fear of persecution, whether or not a person has been recognised as a refugee.
30. EXCOM of the UNHCR, Standing Committee, 8th meeting, EC/47/SC/CRP.28, 5.
Note also the emergence of the "Dublin principle" according to which the first "safe
country" is no longer the EL) country an asylum-seeker reaches first, but the EU country in
which he or she first applies for asylum (Art.7, Dublin Convention): (1997) OJ. C254V1.
31. See e.g. in the UK, R. v. Immigration Appeal Authority, ex p. B [1989] lmm. A.R. 166.
This view was rejected in M. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 1 All E.R.
870. And in New Zealand, Refugee Appeal No.2254/94 Re HB, 21 Sept. 1994.
32. Chahal, supra n.3, at para.79. Paez v. Sweden (Communication No.39/1996, 7 May
1997) was recently decided by the Torture Committee in the same way as Chahal.
Requirements with regards to the applicant under the Political Covenant are broadly similar
to those under the European Convention. See Heffeman, op. cil supra n.l, at p. 104.
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refoulement or torture in these instruments has resulted in protecting
rejected asylum-seekers, criminals, drug traffickers and even terrorists
from removal.31
IV. WHAT ARE THE ADMISSIBILTTY REQUIREMENTS?
WHETHER under the Torture Convention, the Political covenant or the
European Convention, specific requirements must be fulfilled for a
petition to be declared admissible prior to its examination on the merits.
Of the three instruments dealing with the subject, the Torture Committee
offers the most liberal approach.34 Admissibility is a difficult stage indeed
to pass for asylum-seekers under the European Convention35 and also, it
would seem, under the Political Covenant.36 The case law of the Human
Rights Committee seems to reflect that of the Strasbourg organs, with one
33. E.g. Chahal, idem (rejected asylum-seeker and alleged terrorist); D. v. United
Kingdom, supra n.5 (drug smuggler).
34. According to Suntinger, "By the end of 1996, [the Committee against Torture] had
decided 6 refoulement cases on the merits, finding violations of Art.3 CAT in five of these,
and declared another ten cases inadmissible. At the April/May 1997 session, five more
decisions on the merits were taken, with violations of Art.3 found in three cases. One
communication was declared inadmissible": "The prohibition of refoulement: the signifi-
cance of Art J of the UN Convention against Torture", paper presented at the ELENA
course, 1997 (unpublished).
35. The Commission found a violation of Art.3 in an expulsion case for the first time in
1994 {M.N. v. France, Application No.19465/92). Since then, other such cases include
Bahaddar v. The Netherlands (Application No.25894/94) where the Commission found a
violation of Art3 if the applicant were to be expelled to Bangladesh (this decision was,
however, overturned by the E.Ct.H.R. on the ground that not all domestic remedies had
been exhausted, 19 Feb. 1998, Reports of Judg. and Dec. (1998-1) No.64), Hatami v. Sweden
(Application No.32448.96), and B.B. v. France (supra n.14). Several cases have been
rejected by the Commission on the grounds of lack of sufficient evidence showing that the
applicant would face a "real risk" if returned (e.g. Altun v. FRG, No.10308/83, Kozlov v.
Finland, No.16832/90, and A. and F.B.K. v. Turkey, No.14401/88). In a number of cases,
however, a friendly settlement was reached before the Commission adopted a decision on
admissibility.
36. In comparison with the Torture Committee or the Strasbourg organs, the Human
Rights Committee has dealt with very few expulsion cases. More specifically, it reached
views only in cases of expulsion alleging a violation of Art.9 (detention), Art.13 (expulsion
of an alien lawfully in the country) and Art. 14 (due process and fair trial); Maroufidou v.
Sweden, Communication No.58/1979, and A v. Australia, Communication No.560/1993. So
far, every single petition based on Art-7 has been declared inadmissible (V.M.R.B. v.
Canada, Communication No.236/1987, and Stewart v. Canada, Communication No-538/
1993). Views are nevertheless awaited in L v. Canada, Communication No.621/1995, C v.
Canada, Communication No.558/1993, and B v. Canada Communication No.622/1995.
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exception, i.e. the European Commission expects a much higher formal-
ism than the Human Rights Committee.37
A. Competence of the Organ Authorised to Consider the Petition and
Time Limit for Submission
A petition may be brought only against a State and that State must have
accepted the individual complaints jurisdiction, i.e. it has made a
declaration under the first Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant,
Article 22 of the Torture Convention or Article 34 (old Article 25) of the
European Convention.38 In addition, all three instruments preclude the
consideration of an application or a communication if the alleged
violation is not covered by a provision of the instrument, or if it occurred
before the entry into force of the instrument for the State party
concerned, unless the alleged violations continue or have continuing
effects which in themselves constitute a violation.
Article 35(1) (old Article 26) of the European Convention, in laying
down an absolute time limit of six months for introducing complaints
before the Commission, provides a further hurdle for applicants.39 There
is no such time limit before the Human Rights Committee or the Torture
Committee following the exhaustion of local remedies. However, an
extreme delay may be considered an abuse of the right of submission
under Article 41(l)c of the Political Covenant.40
37. The Refugee Convention is outside the scope of this section. Its operation depends
upon the decision of the competent national authorities. A whole range of admissibility
devices, of a jurisdictional and substantive nature, have been developed by European States
in order to introduce a presumption of inadmissibility and justify the recourse to accelerated
procedures in cases which do not satisfy these requirements. These "exception" cases
include, in particular, "safe third country" cases, "manifestly unfounded" claims and "safe
country of origin" cases. For instance, in the UK, out of 28,945 refused asylum applications
in 1997 (excluding dependants), 6,161 were rejected outright on "safe third country" and
"non-compliance" grounds (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Asylum Statistics Untied
Kingdom 1997, Issue 14/98, Table 1.3).
38. In Cruz Varas v. Sweden, supra n.23, the European Court found that the right of
petition had been obstructed by an expulsion order being carried out.
39. This six-month period runs from "service of the written text of the judgment" (Worm
v. Austria, Application No.22714/93).
40. The Torture Convention is silent on this point, and one may find that, by
extrapolation, the same rule would apply.
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B. The "Victim " Requirement and the Role of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs)
An individual (or individuals) petitioning the Strasbourg organs41 or the
Geneva Committees must be a "victim" of a violation by a State party to
the relevant convention/covenant of the rights set forth in that instru-
ment. In addition, anonymous complaints or communications will not be
accepted. Under all three instruments, individual complaints may also be
brought by indirect victims acting as legal representatives. It is neverthe-
less significant that, under the European Convention, the requirement
that the petitioner be a victim of the alleged violation extends to all
categories of petitioners, whether legal or natural persons, individuals or
groups, or NGOs; a difficult requirement to meet in the case of NGOs in
particular. This is not the case under the two other instruments.42 Each
instrument will now be considered in turn.
First, under old Article 25 (now Article 34) of the European
Convention, "the Commission [now the Court] may receive petitions
addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe from any
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming
to be the victim of a violation".41 In assessing the victim requirement, the
Commission refers to all relevant facts particular to each case. Thus, in
cases of expulsion of aliens, it relies on medical reports, the state of health
of the "victim" and the existing conditions in the country where the
"victim" and the existing conditions in the country where the "victim" is
to be expelled.44 Second, Article 22 of the Torture Convention explicitly
provides for communications to be submitted not only by the individual
alleged victim but also by relatives, designated representatives (e.g.
NGOs) or "others on behalf of an alleged victim when it appears that the
victim is unable to submit the communication himself, and the author of
the communication justifies his acting on the victim's behalf". It is for the
third party to establish with sufficient proof his or her authority to act on
41. Before 1 Nov. 1998, an individual, a group of individuals or NGOs could only bring a
case to the Court if they had lodged a complaint to the Commission, if the respondent State
had ratified Protocol IX of the European Convention, and if their case had been screened by
a special panel (Protocol IX, Art.5). Under Protocol XI, all applicants have direct access to
the new Court.
42. The presence of the UNHCR (i.e. an IGO) in Strasbourg demonstrates the pressing
need in having the Strasbourg organs working closer with the UNHCR but also with NGOs.
Their involvement in the European system of protection of human rights should be of great
value considering their experience in human rights protection.
43. The applicant must show that he or she runs the risk of being affected by the law.
Refer to Klass v. Germany (1978, Ser. A, No.28), Marckx v. Belgium (1979, Ser. A, NoJl)
and, Kirkwood v. United Kingdom (1984).
44. J. Madureira, "The Conditions of Foreigners", Council of Europe, Demo
MM4(94)30, p.26, n.80. For instance, in Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France (27 Aug.
1992, Ser. A, No.241-B), the Court refused to recognise the quality of "victim" in the
applicant because no enforceable order of expulsion had yet been issued.
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behalf of the victim.45 Finally, under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to
the Political Covenant, the Human Rights Committee is competent "to
receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party".
The jurisprudence of the Committee shows that "for a person to claim to
be victim of a violation of a right protected by the Covenant, he or she
must show either that an act or omission of a State party has already
adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such an
effect is imminent".46 This concept was somewhat expanded in Kindler v.
Canada to encompass situations where there is "a real risk that his or her
rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction".'47
Provisions of the Political Covenant do not allow for other persons, e.g.
NGOs or relatives, to take a case to the Committee, except in rare
instances where it is possible to consider the relative as an indirect
victim.48 In addition, the Rules of Procedures of the Human Rights
Committee allow for two exceptions: the alleged victim appoints a
representative or the alleged victim is unable to submit the communi-
cation personally and a third party, e.g. an NGO, is authorised to do it.49
C. The Claim Must not be Abusive and there Must Be a Prima Facie
Case
Applications or communications need to be sufficiently clear to avoid
being found abusive and they must provide a minimum amount of
information, in other words be sufficiently substantiated. The European
Convention is restrictive on this point, with Article 35(3) (old Article 27)
referring to the concept of "manifestly ill-founded" petitions in addition
to "an abuse of the right of application". This is not the case with the
Torture Convention (Article 22) or the Political Covenant (Article 3,
Optional Protocol) which speak only of "an abuse of the right of
45. For instance, inM'Bv. Tunisia (UN Doc. A/50/44, Annex V), the Committee declared
inadmissible a communication brought by a person on behalf of a dead victim on the ground
that this third party was unable to provide "sufficient proof to establish his authority to act
on behalf of the victim".
46. E.W. et al. v. Netherlands, Communication No.429/1990.
47. Communication No.470/1991, para.132.
48. Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No.107/1981, para.14.
49. Rule 90(b) of the Rules of Procedure, CCPR/C/3/Rev.4.
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submission of such communications or to be incompatible with the
provisions of this Convention [Covenant]".1*
D. The "Jurisdiction" Requirement and Extraterritorial Effect of
Provisions
While provisions of the Political Covenant are rather unclear on the
matter of "jurisdiction"^1 both the European Convention and the
Torture Convention avoid similar unclear wording. The European
Convention refers to "everyone within their jurisdiction" (Article 1) and
the Torture Convention speaks of "acts of torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction" (Article 2(1)).52 The extraterritorial effect of Article 3 of
the European Convention was first recognised in Soering v. United
Kingdom,53 where the Court ruled that the United Kingdom would be in
violation of Article 3 if it were to extradite Jens Soering to the United
States, a non-member of the Council of Europe, to face the death penalty
in Virginia. It has since been applied to cases of expulsion and
refoulement.54 This effect was similarly recognised by the Torture
Committee in cases of refoulement55 and by the Human Rights Com-
mittee in a series of cases involving individuals awaiting extradition from
Canada to the United States where they would face the death penalty.56
50. For instance, in X. v. Spain (Communication No.23/1995), the Torture Committee
declared the communication inadmissible because it had "not been sufficiently justified".
The author had failed to show serious grounds for believing that he risked being tortured if
expelled to Algeria; there was no indication that he had previously been detained or
tortured but, rather, a statement that he intended to seek work. And in Lang v. Australia
(Communication No.659/1995), the Human Rights Committee stated that "sweeping
allegations" which "do not in any way reveal how the author's rights under the Covenant
might have been violated" are insufficient.
51. Artl, Optional Protocol and Art.2(l), Political Covenant. Amerasinghe interpreted
both provisions to mean that the Covenant should apply only in respect of persons within the
territory as well as subject to the jurisdiction of the State. See C. F. Amerasinghe, Local
Remedies in International Law (1990), pp.147-149. This view was not shared by Meron, who
argued that "Most of the provisions of the Refugee Convention, in contrast to those of the
Political Covenant, may be primarily territorial in character, in the sense that they apply to
claimants who have reached the soil of the state of asylum" and concluded that a narrow
territorial construction must be excluded. See T. Meron, "Extraterritoriality of Human
Rights Treaties" (1995) 89 AJ.I.L. 81.
52. In D. v. United Kingdom, supra n.5, at para.48, the E.Ct.H.R. explained that even if
the applicant never entered the UK in the technical sense, he had been within the
jurisdiction of the UK, in custody, at Gatwick airport. Thus, for the Court, it was sufficient
that "he had been physically present there".
53. Supra n.6.
54. E.g. Chahal, supra n3.
55. E.g. Mutombo, supra n.20.
56. The principle was first held in Kindler v. Canada, supra n.47. It was reiterated in Ng v.
Canada, Communication No.469/1991, and Cox v. Canada, Communication No.539/1993.
However, a violation of Art.7 of the Covenant was found in only one case, Ng v. Canada
(ibid).
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E. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies has long been accepted in
customary international law.57 In all three instruments under review, the
alleged victim must show that all domestic remedies have been exhaus-
ted.58 More specifically, the Torture Convention and the Political
Covenant (Optional Protocol) speak only of domestic remedies which are
available and recognise that this includes situations where the application
of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.59 In addition, the Torture
Convention requires that the remedy be one likely to bring effective
relief.
Although similar criteria (i.e. availability, not unreasonably prolonged,
and likely to bring effective redress) are being used by the Strasbourg and
Geneva organs to decide on this requirement, they are applied more
restrictively by the European Commission than by the two Committees.
And, indeed, many cases brought to the Commission are declared
inadmissible on the grounds that domestic law provides an effective
remedy.60 For instance, in cases of deportation or expulsion to a country
where the applicant would be faced with a life-threatening sentence, the
European Commission, while recognising that a remedy needs to have
suspensive effect in order to be effective, failed to take into account the
special circumstances (i.e. the gravity of the treatment) and to assess the
possibility of access to such remedy by the applicant.61 More specifically,
in cases involving asylum-seekers, the Commission considers that all
domestic remedies under Article 35(1) (old Article 26) have not been
exhausted where the "victim" did not request political asylum, or did not
lodge an appeal against the decision of the State not to grant refugee
status or against the decision of expulsion. The application will thus be
declared inadmissible under Article 35(4) (old Article 27(3)) of the
Convention.62 Findings of the Torture and Human Rights Committees
57. Inlerhandel Case, I.CJ. Rep. 1959, 27.
58. Art.41(l)c, Political Covenant and Art.5(2)b, First Optional Protocol; Art35(1) (old
Art.26), European Convention; and Art.22(5)b, Torture Convention. See also Ameras-
inghe, op. cil supra n.51, at pp.86-88. If a State chooses to dispute the exhaustion of local
remedies, the burden of proof falls on it to offer substantiating evidence to support its
argument.
59. In Halimi-Nedzibi v. Austria, Communication No.8/1991, the Torture Committee
held that a delay of 15 months may be considered unreasonably prolonged.
60. In Colder v. United Kingdom (21 Feb. 1975, Ser. A, No.18) "remedy" was found to be
wider under art.13 than under Art.26 (now Art.35(l)). However, in a quite unprecedented
ruling, the E.Ct.H.R. refused to consider the merits of an application lodged by a rejected
asylum-seeker (Mr Bahaddar) on the ground that his application had failed to exhaust all
national remedies, in spite of the findings by the Commission that his expulsion would
constitute a violation of Art3 of the Convention (19 Feb. 1998, supra n.35).
61. M. v. United Kingdom, Application No.12268/86. The application was declared
inadmissible on the grounds that national remedies had not been exhausted.
62. See Madureira, op. cil. supra n.44, at p.26, n.81.
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show a more liberal application of these criteria. Inadmissibility on this
ground seems to be declared only in quite clear-cut cases.63 For instance,
the Torture Committee considered the "new application" remedy (in the
context of an application for refugee status in Sweden) as ineffective
where a domestic authority was not given the opportunity to evaluate the
new evidence submitted by the author before the Committee could
examine the communication.64 In another instance, the Torture Com-
mittee declared the communication inadmissible on the grounds that the
expulsion order was still subject to an appeal and that no circumstances
had been invoked showing that this remedy would be unlikely to bring
effective relief. Indeed, the facts of the case showed that the appeal was
pending and that a second expulsion order had already been quashed.65
The plea of "special circumstances" is therefore accepted by the Torture
Committee; rarely so by the Strasbourg organs.66 The case law of the
Human Rights Committee seems to suggest that such plea is accepted;67
however, Nowak points out that its case law on deportation to a country
of persecution where the remedy is without suspensive effect seems
rather vague.68
F. No Similar Complaint is Being Considered (or Has Been
Considered) by Another International Institution
Both the European Convention (Article 35(2)b, old Article 27(l)b) and
the Torture Convention (Article 22(5)a) exclude from the scope of
admission any petition already submitted to another procedure for
63. See Nowak, op. cu. supra n.ll, at p.704, and Harris, Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights (1995), pp.608-621.
64. P.M.P.K. v. Sweden, Communication No30/1995, and K.K.H. v. Canada, Communi-
cation No35/1995.
65. N.D. v. France, Communication NoJ2/1995.
66. Harris et al., op. cit. supra n.63, at p.621. There is some inconsistency, however, in the
case law of the E.CLH.R., as highlighted in Bahaddar v. The Netherlands (Application
No.25894/94). In this case, the European Commission unanimously interpreted broadly the
plea of "special circumstances" in order to absolve the applicant from exhausting domestic
remedies at his disposal (13 Sept. 19%). The Court adopted a more restrictive view, ruling
(19 Feb. 1998, supra, n.35) that it would not consider the merits of the case because local
remedies had not been exhausted (the applicant had failed to convince the Court that failure
to submit grounds of appeal within the time limit was due to the unavailability of
documentary evidence). This "excessive formalism" was strongly criticised by some of the
dissenting judges as potentially undermining the absolute character of the prohibition
provided in Art.3.
67. According to a "jurisprudence constante", in cases of the death sentence, a
constitutional motion may not constitute an available remedy in the absence of legal aid
{Graham and Morrison v. Jamaica, Communication No.461/1991).
68. In particular, he refers to Communications 173,175/1984 declared inadmissible on the
grounds of non-substantiation of allegations or lack of claim. See Nowak, op. cit. supra n.l 1,
at pp.137, 705.
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international investigation or settlement.69 In contrast, Article 5(2)a of
the first Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant merely requires that
"the same matter is not examined under another procedure of inter-
national investigation or settlement", thus ruling out only the simul-
taneous examination of the same concrete, individual case submitted by
the same individual, or by a third party but with his or her knowledge.70
However, the effect of reservations entered by most member States of the
Council of Europe has brought Article 5(2) of the Political Covenant
(Optional Protocol) to read like Article 22(5)a of the Torture Conven-
tion, thereby preventing any potential competition between procedures
before the European Commission and procedures before the Human
Rights Committee.71 Under all three instruments, non-conventional
procedures such as those under the Human Rights Commission and its
special rapporteurs are excluded from the scope of these provisions.72
G. Interim Measures of Protection
On average, a case which is found to be admissible can take from two and
a half to four years to be decided upon by the Human Rights Committee,
and two years in the case of the Torture Committee, except where the
Committee may decide a case within a few months on grounds of
emergency.73 The sophisticated, and complex, character of the European
Convention supervisory system has resulted in cases taking, on average,
between five and six years for a ruling by the European Court of Human
Rights. This does not take into account the initial delay of sometimes up
to 18 months for the European Commission to consider an application
due to a backlog.74 This time element, coupled with the fact that, in cases
involving "rejected asylum-seekers", an order of expulsion or deport-
ation is usually imminent, gives to the issue of interim measures a certain
urgency. Interim measures of protection against a deportation, expulsion
69. E.g. Clacerrada Fornieles el at v. Spain (Application No.1751/90) declared inadmis-
sible by the European Commission on the ground that substantially the same matter was
being considered by the Human Rights Committee.
70. See Nowak, op. cit. supra n.ll, at p.698.
71. This is the case, for instance, of the reservations- entered by France and Spain
(Valentijn v. France, Communication No.584/1994; V.E.M. v. Spain, Communication
No.467/1991). See Nowalc, idem, p.700.
72. Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No.74/1980 (Human Rights Committee);
Mutombo, supra n.20 (Torture Committee).
73. See O'Flaherty, op. cil supra n25, at pp.48,158.
74. See M. Janis etal, European Human Rights Law—Text and Materials (1995), p.92. It
is further argued that the reform of the procedure following the entry into force of Protocol
XI "should of itself shorten the length of proceedings by some 18 months to two years":
idem, p.93. Also under the Xlth Protocol procedure, the new Court has the opportunity to
act promptly and with authority (Ocalan v. Turkey, judgment of 22 Feb. 1999).
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or extradition order may be indicated under the Rules of Procedures of
the European Commission (rule 39, old rule 36), the Human Rights
Committee (rule 86), and the Torture Committee (rule 108(9)).75 Since
neither the Commission nor the Committees sit on a permanent basis,
interim measures are usually considered by the President of the
Commission and, in the case of the two Committees, by a special
rapporteur. Under all three instruments, interim measures of protection
may be granted only in cases where an asylum-seeker can show that
"irreparable" or "irretrievable" damage would occur if he or she was
expelled prior to the European Commission, the Torture Committee or
the Human Rights Committee taking a decision on the admissibility or on
the merits of a complaint. The rules are clearly designed to deal with
emergency situations. The "irreparable" or "irretrievable" character of
the damage is a difficult element to prove, particularly before the
European Commission, because the Commission requires a certain
degree of probability (i.e. factual or material evidence) that the applicant
will risk being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to his or her country
of origin before the Commission can decide on the case.76 Applications
for interim measures have suspensive effect in all cases of expulsion,
deportation or extradition. Interim measures are generally not legally
binding77 and, notwithstanding some rare cases,78 they are usually
complied with by States.79
Finally, while some legal aid may be available in proceedings before the
Strasbourg organs, there is no financial assistance for needy individuals
who wish to bring a complaint to the Human Rights Committee or the
Torture Committee.80 Furthermore, Article 41 (old Article 50) of the
75. The term "indicate" was given preference over the term "request" to avoid any
possible doubts on whether or not the Human Rights Committee, and by analogy the
Torture Committee or the European Commission, could reasonably perform "implied
powers" provided in the Rules of Procedure but not in the text of the treaty. See
McGoldrick, op. cit supra n.ll, at p.131.
76. See Harris et al, op. at. supra n.63, at p-590.
77. This was confirmed by the E.Ct.H.R. in Cruz Varas, supra n.23, where the Court
described the general practice of States as a mere illustration of "good faith compliance".
See Harris et al., ibid.
78. Mansi v. Sweden (Application No.15658/89) and Cruz Varas (ibid), both cases
decided by the Strasbourg organs. See also Nunez v. Venezuela (Communication
No.l 10/1998) decided by the Torture Committee, and the Ashby case in which the Human
Rights Committee vainly requested Trinidad and Tobago to suspend the execution of the
applicant until a decision on the case had been reached by the Committee (1994 Report of
the Human Rights Committee, A/49/40, pp.70-71).
79. E.g. Soering, supra n.6, Mutombo, supra n.20, and Khan v. Canada (Communication
No.15/1994). The prompt compliance by a State depends very much on the power of
persuasion of the authority indicating the measures that they are both necessary and
desirable.
80. See O'Flaherty, op. tit supra n.25, at pp.47, 158. It has been found that it costs an
average of £30,000 to get an action into the E.CLH.R.: (1998) 68 B.Y.I.L. 508.
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European Convention expressly provides for the award of "just satisfac-
tion to the injured party". Though awards are on restrictive grounds, it
remains an attractive option for applicants.81 The practice of the Human
Rights Committee shows that compensation is often suggested and
accepted to be paid by States, despite the non-binding nature of such
payment.82
V. WHAT KINDS OF ILL-TREATMENT MAY PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR
NON-REFO ULEMENT1
THE treatment which must be prevented varies between threats to the
refugee's life or freedom (Article 33, Refugee Convention), torture
(Article 3, Torture Convention), torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment (Article 3, European Convention), and torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7,
Political Covenant). Of these four instruments, the European Conven-
tion, as interpreted by its organs, is the most liberal on the issue of the
particular treatment which must be prevented.
As a result of a restrictive interpretation of the definition of a refugee
under the Refugee Convention,83 protection against refoulement is
increasingly becoming a matter of policy consideration and of govern-
ment discretion.84 In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights and
the Human Rights Committee,85 through a wide interpretation of the
words "inhuman or degrading treatment", have allowed anyone, includ-
81. Mansi, supra n.78. Nevertheless in Ahmed (supra n.14) the Court ruled that Ahmed's
repatriation would constitute a violation of Art.3 but denied his request for financial
compensation on the ground that the judgment constituted sufficient just satisfaction. In
view of the fact that Ahmed was refused a residence permit and denied the right to work,
and as a result committed suicide, this raises the difficult issue of "just satisfaction" in the
context of degrading treatment following a successful application on the ground of Art.3, an
issue that the Court has not yet been willing to address.
82. Bautista v. Columbia, Communication No.563/1993, paras.8.6 and 10. See Heffernan,
op. cit. supra n.l, at p.110.
83. The words "where his life or freedom would be threatened" are considered to have
the same meaning as "well-founded fear of persecution" in Art.lA(2) of the Refugee
Convention. See P. Weis (Ed.), The Refugee Convention, 1951 (1995), p.341.
84. Many rejected applicants for the status of refugee are allowed to remain at least
temporarily. For instance, in 1997, out of 36,045 first-instance decisions taken in the UK
(excluding dependants), 3,985 (11%) recognised refugee status, 3,115 (9%) did not
recognise refugee status but granted exceptional leave to remain and 28,945 (80%) refused
asylum and exceptional leave. In addition, the British government has allowed groups of
people to remain on an exceptional basis, without applying for asylum (e.g. former
Yugoslavs). Home Office Statistical Bulletin, op. cit. supra nSI, at Table 1.2 and
explanatory note 13.
85. The practice of the Human Rights Committee, although resembling that of the
European Court on which it is based, seems, however, less consistent. See McGoldrick, op.
cit supra n.ll, at pp.368-371.
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ing rejected asylum-seekers, to seek protection against refoulement.86
However, the views of the Human Rights Committee lack reasoning,
creating therefore undesirable uncertainty for authors of a complaint.87
More particularly, the Strasbourg organs recognise the application of
Article 3 from the cumulative effect of ill-treatment, which if taken
individually would not reach the threshold of severity required by Article
3.^ As regards the Torture Committee, it is restricted by the scope of the
provisions of the Convention: non-refoulement is limited to torture and
does riot extend to less serious ill-treatments.89 The three elements of
intent and intensity of the pain, source of the act, and purpose, thus,
constitute a stringent requirement for activating protection.90 This is not
the case under the Political Covenant or European Convention, where
one or more of these elements may be lacking." The distinction between
torture and other treatments not amounting to torture is therefore crucial
under the Torture Convention.92 A further, and perhaps even more
important, drawback is that the Torture Convention does not outlaw
"pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions".91 On this account, uncertainties remain as to whether the
86. In terms of protection against ill-treatment in the event of an expulsion, it does not
really matter whether Art.3 (European Convention) or Art.7 (Political Covenant) applies
on the basis of torture or degrading treatment, except perhaps that the Court or Committee
will be more sympathetic towards a case where torture or death is at stake. Outside
expulsion cases, the difference between torture and degrading treatment is mainly relevant
for the E.Ct.H.R. in matters of compensation because the treatment has already occurred.
87. As observed by Nowak, op. cit. supra n.ll, at p.135, the Human Rights Committee
does not usually differentiate between categories of treatment and prefers referring to wider
terms such as "severe treatment" or "ill-treatment", a satisfactory solution in practice as
long as the treatment falls into the scope of Art.7.
88. Ahmed, supra n.14, H.L.R. v. France, 29 Apr. 1997, Reports of Judg. and Dec.
(1997-III) No.36. In D. v. United Kingdom, supra nS, the Court stressed the "very
exceptional circumstances" and the "compelling humanitarian considerations at stake". See
also B.B. v. France (supra n.14) where the Commission reported that confronting alone an
illness such as AIDS at an advanced stage would constitute degrading treatment. However,
it rejected a similar claim because the illness of the applicant was not yet in an advanced
stage {Karara v. United Kingdom, Application No.40900/98).
89. Arts.3 and 16. J. Voyame, "La Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture", in A.
Cassesse (Ed.), 77*» International Fight Against Torture (1991), p.49.
90. Art.l, Torture Convention. Only torture is prohibited in absolute terms (Art2(2),
(3)). See A. Boulesbaa, "The Nature of the Obligations Incurred by States under Article 2 of
the UN Convention Against Torture" (1990) 12 H.R.Q. 53-93.
91. The attitude of the European Court, however, lacks consistency on this matter. In
Ireland v. United Kingdom (supra n.18), it seemed to suggest that the suffering needs to be
caused intentionally and for a purpose in order to be regarded as torture, but not with regard
to other ill-treatment, whereas, in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom
(28 May 1985, Ser. A, No.94) intent seemed to be necessary in order to have degrading
treatment.
92. There are as yet no views on this issue and one hopes that the Torture Committee will
not follow the precedent set by the E.Ct.H.R. in Ireland v. United Kingdom. See Suntinger,
op. cU. supra n.10, at section IV.
93. Art l .
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Convention establishes a common notion of lawful sanction or as to
whether one should refer to the domestic legal system of each State.94
Finally, there is the question of the incidence of the source of the
ill-treatment on the success of an application for protection against
refoulement. Under the Refugee Convention, the reference to "is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" in Article
1 A(2), has led many contracting parties to recognise refugee status only
to applicants who fear persecution by State agents or, when persecution is
feared from non-State agents, only where the State is unwilling to provide
protection.95 This is not the position of the UNHCR, who does not
distinguish between State and non-State agents of persecution where the
State is unwilling but also unable to provide protection. Similarly, the
Human Rights Committee and the Strasbourg organs do not consider the
source of the risk of ill-treatment to be relevant. The Human Rights
Committee nevertheless requires that the conduct be imputable to the
State,96 an element no longer required by the European Court of Human
94. Voyame (op. cit supra n.89, at p.46), in particular, refers to certain practices (e.g.
sexual mutilation and prolonged detention) rooted in the law of countries and raises the
question of their legality under the Convention. He concludes by recognising the delicate
character of the matter and by acknowledging that the Committee will have to deal with this.
He also highlights problems related to customs and religions, to the country's lack of
resources resulting in an emphasis on services such as education or health to the detriment of
other sectors, e.g. prisons. The recent case of P.L.Q. v. Canada (supra n.14) nevertheless
suggests that the Torture Committee chose to refer to the domestic legal system of the state
in question.
95. See Joint Position defined by the Council of the European Union on the harmonised
application of the definition of the term "refugee" in Art.l of the Refugee Convention. See
also the position recently taken by the UK (no refugee status but exceptional leave to
remain granted to people fleeing the civil war in Somalia, R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex p. Adan, 2 Apr. 1998 (HL) (1998) 37 I.L.M. 1090), Germany (no
refugee status and no protection against deportation for civil war refugees from Somalia,
BVerwg, 15 Apr. 1997, 9 C 15.96 and 9 C 38.96; the key factor seems to be the risk of
persecution from State-like organisations in all regions of the State in question, i.e.
Afghanistan, BVerwg, 4 Nov. 1997, 9 C 34.94) and the Netherlands (well-founded fear of
persecution may exist in a case where no central or de facto government exists, District
Court of The Hague, 27 Aug. 1998, AWB 98/3068).
96. In its General Comment on Art.7 of the Political Covenant, the Human Rights
Committee recognised that "it is the duty of public authorities to ensure protection by the
law against such treatment even when committed by persons acting outside or without any
official authority". See also, Johnson v. Jamaica (Communication No.588/1994), Chaplin v.
Jamaica (Communication No.596/1994), and Stephens v. Jamaica (Communication
No.373/1989).
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Rights since H.L.R. v. France.™ As for the Torture Convention, it is clear
and restrictive on the matter. According to Article 1(1), there must be an
act of public officials (i.e. the pain or suffering must "be inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity")98
VI. WHAT ARE THE EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS?
STANDARD of proof, method of assessment of evidence, and decisive
factors (i.e. particular circumstances) in the determination process of a
legal claim are key elements in the appraisal of the effectiveness of a
system offering to protect legal rights. The Refugee Convention does not
deal with these requirements but the UNHCR guidelines require that
"good reasons" be shown by the applicant that his or her fear be of "a
reasonable degree" and that the applicant be given the benefit of the
doubt." Contracting parties to the Refugee Convention are nevertheless
free to determine their own criteria in deciding who is a refugee, including
the appropriate standard of proof. Some States are clearly more
restrictive than others in assessing the well-foundedness of the fear of
persecution. However, it is generally accepted that where no conclusive
evidence on the facts exist to back up a bona fide request for refugee
status, the applicant be nevertheless granted protection against refoule-
ment. The Strasbourg and Geneva organs apply a higher standard of
proof than that set by the UNHCR. An asylum-seeker must indeed show
two things: first, the existence of "substantial grounds" (for believing that,
in the event of expulsion, he or she would face ill-treatment);100 second,
the existence of a "real risk" (that, in the event of expulsion, he or she,
personally, is expected to face ill-treatment).101 More specifically, the
97. In both Soering (supra n.6) and Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom (30 Oct. 1991, Ser. A,
No.215), the Court required that certain conditions be met. In Chahal (supra n.3), risk of
ill-treatment was not coming from the State but from other factions. In Ahmed (supra n.14),
the Court, by recognising a violation of Art.3 in spite of the lack of State authority in
Somalia, indirectly supported the view taken by the UNHCR that protection should be
given irrespective of whether the lack of national protection against persecution can be
attributed to a positive intention to harm on the part of the State. But the principle that
agents of persecution may either be public officials or private individuals, provided the risk
is real and State authorities are unable to provide protection or alleviate the risk, was held
only in H.L.R. v. France (supra n.88, at para.40). And this principle was enlarged, in D. v.
United Kingdom (supra n.5, at para.49) to cases where the risk of ill-treatment emanating
from the public authority or private group is not even intentionally inflicted, and "cannot
therefore engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public authorities of
that country".
98. G.R.B. v. Sweden, Communication No.83/1997.
99. UNHCR Handbook, paras.45,41, 196.
100. The requirement for "substantial grounds" means that expulsion, extradition or
deportation per se do not in normal circumstances amount to ill-treatment or punishment;
there need to be "certain circumstances" for Art3 of the European Convention, Art.7 of the
Political Covenant, or Art.3 of the Torture Covenant to become relevant.
101. The point of time to assess the risk is the situation when refoulement is taking place.
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standard of proof is set extremely high under the European Convention
and the Political Covenant. The importance given to the "right sort" of
evidence by the Strasbourg organs and the Human Rights Committee
makes the gathering of information a crucial element.102 In addition, it is
for the asylum-seeker to show "substantial grounds" and "real risk".103 In
contrast, the standard of proof seems much lower under the Torture
Convention since the existence of mass violation of human rights in the
country of origin may expressly be relied upon. The practice of European
States in giving asylum-seekers temporary leave to remain on humani-
tarian grounds relies on similar assessments of generalised violations of
human rights. Moreover, European States recognise that the burden of
proof is shared between the asylum-seeker and the competent authori-
ties. The Torture Convention is silent on who has to show "substantial
grounds".
In proving a "well-founded fear" of persecution, European States
generally require that sufficient facts be provided by the asylum-seeker to
enable the competent national authority to conclude one way or another
that, if returned to his or her country of origin, the asylum-seeker would
face a serious risk of harm.104 While the facts relied upon by the
asylum-seeker must be proved on a balance of probability,105 in some
States the legal test for the risk is set lower. For instance, in assessing the
"risk" element, the Swiss and German courts require a "considerable
probability" that the asylum-seeker will be persecuted if returned.106 This
is not the case in the United Kingdom, where the House of Lords requires
10Z This is often an impossible task to do without recourse to NGOs. The role of NGOs in
this respect could be emphasised and formalised.
103. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee has come to recognise that the burden of
proof does not rest alone on the author of the application but, rather, that it must be shared
between the author and the State against which the application is brought. See McGoldrick,
op. ds. supra n.ll, at p.149.
104. See Goodwin-Gill, op. cil supra n.ll, at pp349-352.
105. The facts put forward by the asylum-seeker in his or her testimony should describe a
truthful set of events (e.g. torture, detention or discrimination) and establish a credible link
between these events and himself or herself as an individual. In the UK the Court of Appeal,
while deciding that a fraudulent claim based on false facts may not deprive an asylum-seeker
from the protection of the Refugee Convention, nevertheless recognised that the
asylum-seeker would be devoid of any credibility and would therefore be unlikely to prove
to the required standard a genuine subjective fear of persecution: M. v. Secretary of Slate for
the Home Department [19%] 1 All E.R. 870.
106. This is quite a restrictive test because, according to this standard, a fact is proved only
if its existence is "more likely than not". So, persecution would be relevant only if the
chances that it will take place are larger than 50%. See R. Marx, "The Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status in the Federal Republic of Germany" (1992) 4 IJ.R.L. 165, and
Art.12a of the Swiss Asylum Law 1979, as amended.
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a "reasonable degree of likelihood".107 As for Sweden, in spite of a
reference to "reasonable grounds" in the legislation, the procedure has
been questioned by both the European Commission and the Torture
Committee for failing to apply the test to assess evidence provided in the
law.108 While the burden of proof in principle lies on the applicant, the
duty to ascertain and evaluate information on the human rights situation
in the country of origin is shared between the applicant and the
examiner.109 As a result of considerable difficulties faced by asylum-
seekers and national authorities in obtaining reliable circumstantial
evidence on countries of origin, two documentation centres, the Cana-
dian Immigration and Refugee Board Documentation Centre (IRBDC)
and the UNHCR's Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR), have
been established. Their task is to gather and make available information
from various sources (i.e. newspapers, broadcast reports, governmental
and non-governmental agencies' reports, or embassies in countries of
origin reports), and to corroborate it where possible. This is in response to
recognition of credibility and truthworthiness of information as being
"the essential foundation for good decisions".110 Finally, European States
have interpreted the Refugee Convention to preclude refugee status to
applicants who cannot be "singled out" as individuals. The asylum-seeker
may still be granted protection against refoulement on humanitarian
grounds, where he or she is a member of a group against whom there
exists a pattern of persecution.1" Similar subsidiary protection may
equally be granted where no conclusive evidence on the facts is found yet
107. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Sivakumaran [1988] 1 All E.R.
193. Lord Keith of Kintel considered the notions "reasonable chance" and "serious
possibility" as appropriate expressions of the degree of likelihood to be satisfied for a fear of
persecution to be well-founded.
108. Before the European Commission, Hatami {supra n.35), Raguz v. Austria (Appli-
cation 26300/95). Before the Torture Committee, Communications Nos.39/1996, 41/1996,
43/1996,89/1997,101/1997,88/1997. Note, however, that since the entry into force of the new
Aliens Act 1997, a distinction has been introduced between cases involving victims of
torture (where complete accuracy is no longer required) and other cases.
109. UNHCR Handbook, para. 196.
110. See Goodwin-Gill, op. til. supra n.ll,at p.352, and J. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee
Status (1991), p.81.
111. See Goodwin-Gill, idem, pp.76-77. E.g. in the UK the Court of Appeal decided that in
order to be granted refugee status, an asylum-seeker must have an independent fear of
persecution from the fear shared by an identifiable group of persons to which he or she
belongs: R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex p. Shah [1997] Imm. A.R. 584.
See also Hathaway, idem, pp.89-97.
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the asylum-seeker has a credible fear of persecution.112 This is in
compliance with UNHCR guidelines that asylum-seekers must be given
the benefit of the doubt.
The European Court of Human Rights has recently recognised the
relevance of Article 3 of the European Convention to the expulsion of
asylum-seekers "whenever substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State".113 The
principle was first held in 1989, in Soering v. United Kingdom}1* in the
context of extradition. It was further extended to cases of expulsion,
removal and deportation of asylum-seekers in Cruz Varas v. Sweden,115
Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom116 Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v.
France111 Chahal v. United Kingdom11* and Ahmed v. Austria119unac-
companied children in Nsona v. Netherlands120 and even drug smugglers
in H.L.R. v. France111 and D. v. United Kingdom.12* In assessing the
existence of "substantial grounds" in cases of expulsion, the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights consider whether reasonable
grounds exist that expulsion is going to take place.123 In particular, it will
look at whether the applicant is going to be expelled for certain and
112. In the UK the asylum-seeker will be granted exceptional leave to remain. This is a
decision taken by the Home Office outside the immigration rules. See, in particular, the
Secretary of State's public policy statement that "We use exceptional leave to remain to
respond to cases that are outside the [Refugee] Convention but within the terms of our other
obligations, including the European Convention of Human Rights" {Secretary of State for
the Home Department v. Jafar Danaie [1998] 1mm. A.R. 87). Figures for the last ten years,
however, indicate a constant drop in the number of first-instance decisions granting
exceptional leave to remain (64% of total decisions in 1987,10% in 1997) but a rise in the
number of decisions refusing asylum and exceptional leave (23% in 1987, 77% in 1997),
while the number of decisions recognising refugee status has remained generally the same
(13%). See Home Office Statistical Bulletin, op. cil supra n.37, at Table 1.2.
113. Chahal, supra n3, at para.80.




118. Supra nJ .
119. Supra n.14.
120. 28 Nov. 19%, Reports of Judg. and Dec (1996-V) No.23.
121. Supra n.88.
122. Supra n.5.
123. In Soering the Court concluded that "the likelihood of the feared exposure of the
applicant to the 'death row phenomenon' has been shown to be such as to bring Article 3
into play" (supra n.6, at para.99). In Vilvarajah the Court held that "A mere possibility of
ill-treatment, however, in such circumstances [i.e. the personal position of the applicants was
not any worse than the generality of other members of the Tamil community] is not in itself
sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3" (supra n.97, at para.lll).
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imminently,124 and at whether the country to which the applicant is to be
expelled may subject this person to such treatment. The Court requires
that the individual be singled out from a situation of general violence.'25
Once reasonable grounds that expulsion is going to take place have been
found the element of "real risk" can be assessed. The Court recognises a
"real risk" when "the foreseeable consequences" of the State party's
decision to extradite (expel or deport) is that the applicant will be subject
to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the requesting country.126 In
assessing such foreseeability, the Court takes various considerations into
account (e.g. the general and special circumstances of each individual
case, the relevant national legislation and practice relating to expulsion,
the situation in the country of destination, in particular the current
probability of torture, persecution, inhuman or degrading treatment,
according to the reports and conclusions of investigations carried out by
the national authorities, the United Nations and even sometimes certain
non-governmental organisations). In this regard, the Soering case was
quite simple "because the ill-treatment which Mr Soering risked was
going to be administered by the State of Virginia in accordance with its
law".IZ7 In less clear cases, a high degree of proof is required. For instance,
in the Chahal case, the defence team gathered an unprecedented amount
of evidence, including a report by Amnesty International showing that
the Punjab police were exercising activities violating human rights inside
as well as outside their jurisdiction, and a violation of Article 3 was
found.128 However, the Court did not find a violation of Article 3 in
H.L.R. v. France, despite the similarities between these two cases.129 And,
in the Ahmed case, a key factor for the Court in finding that the risk was
serious was the recognition of the applicant as a refugee by the Home
Secretary, in 1992. Thus, H.L. R. v. France, and also Cruz Varas v. Sweden,
demonstrate the importance of evidence, particularly when submitting a
124. In Vijayanathan and Pusparajah the Court held that as "no expulsion order has been
made with respect to the applicants . . . Mr Vijayanathan and Mr Pusparajah cannot, as
matters stand, claim 'to be the victim[s] of a violation' within the meaning of Article 25(1) of
the Convention" (supra n.44, at para.46).
125. This was clearly stated in Vilvarajah (supra n.97, at para.Ill) and more recently in
H.L.R. v. France (supra n.88, at para.42). The risk of being sent on to a third country may
also be considered, although the Strasbourg organs have not yet taken a position on this.
126. Soering, supra n.6, at para.90. See also e.g. H.L.R. v. France, idem, para.39.
127. C. Ovey, "Prohibition of Refoulement: The Meaning of Article 3 of the E.C.H.R.",
ELENA International Course (1997), p. 11 (unpublished).
128. The Court considers objective independent reports as high-level evidence. Amnesty
International reports are based on individual affidavits and therefore constitute a lower
level of evidence. However, such reports carried considerable weight in Chahal (supra n.3,
at paras.99-100).
129. In particular, Judge Pekkanen argued in his dissenting opinion that the risk of
ill-treatment was serious in both cases, but the Court found that concrete evidence of such a
risk was much stronger in Chahal than in H.L.R.
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case involving national security. Both these cases show that a case before
the Strasbourg organs is more likely to fail on a matter of evidence than
on a matter of principle.130 Note, however, that in the recent case of
Hatami v. Sweden, the European Commission of Human Rights con-
sidered that "complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of
torture".131 The Court has not yet ruled on the possible contradictions and
inconsistencies of victims of torture.
As under the European Convention, it is in cases of extradition that the
Human Rights Committee has developed important principles that may
be applied to expulsion cases.132 In particular, it held that extradition of a
person from a country to another country is not unlawful133 but that "If a
State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances
such that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights under the
Covenant will be in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in
violation of the Covenant".134 And "real risk" exists when the "necessary
and foreseeable consequence" of the State party's decision is that the
person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdic-
tion. It further stated that this "would mean that there was a present
violation by the State party, even though the consequence would not
occur until later on".'35The approach of the Human Rights Committee is
clearly based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, in particular Soering v. United Kingdom.136 Its work is neverthe-
less characterised by the narrow scope of the evidence which it is allowed
to consider. Under Article 5(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Political
Covenant, the Committee may consider only "written information made
available to it by the individual and the State Party concerned". Thus, oral
submissions (e.g. oral examination of the parties or witnesses) may not be
relied upon, nor may the written results of on-site inspections by the
Committee, except where brought to the attention of the Committee in
written form by the individual or State concerned. This is also true of
other documents, such as State reports or reports by UN agencies or
130. Once "substantial grounds" and "real risk" have been shown, a minimum level of
severity must still be shown for the treatment to be considered as torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment: supra Part V.
131. Supra n.35. Note that the same view has been held by the Torture Committee since
Alan v. Switzerland (Communication No.21/1995)
132. In a more general context, the Human Rights Committee stated that "States parties
must not expose individuals to the anger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition,
expulsion or refoulement": General Comment 20/44, para.9, on Art.7.
133. M.A. v. Italy, Communication No.117/1981, para.13.4.
134. Kindler, supra n.47, at para. 13.2. This view was confirmed in Sg and Cox (both supra
n.56).
135. Kindler, idem, para.6.2.
136. Idem, para. 15.3.
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non-governmental organisations.117 As a result, the Committee found
that extradition to face execution by gas asphyxiation amounted to a
violation of Article 7 in only one case, Ng v. Canada.m
The principle that expulsion to a country could constitute a violation of
Article 3 of the Torture Convention was first recognised in 1994, in
Mutombo v. Switzerland, whenever "there are substantial grounds for
believing that [the applicant] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture", and torture was found to be the "foreseeable and necessary
consequence" of expulsion on account of all relevant considerations,
including the general situation in Zaire, which was found to be one of
mass violation of human rights."9 This case further reveals that the author
of a communication must show that the risk or danger of being subjected
to torture concerns him or her personally.140 Expulsion, in the event that it
would take place, was again found to constitute a violation of Article 3 in,
for instance, Alan v. Switzerland}4^ Kisoki v. Sweden,142 Tala v. Sweden}4*
Paez v. Sweden,144 A. v. The Netherlands"* and Aydin v. Sweden}46 The
Committee, however, found no such violation in X. v. Netherlands}41
137. There is nothing, however, preventing the Committee from referring to such reports
as part of its own expert knowledge heritage. See Nowak. op. cit supra n.ll, at p.693.
138. Mr Kurt Hemdl, in his dissenting opinion, however, pointed out that the Committee
failed to rely on enough evidence, in particular, scientific evidence. In both Kindler, idem,
and Cox (supra n.56) the Committee reached the conclusion that there would be no
violation of Art.7. See also Chaplin, supra n.96 (no compelling circumstances, no violation
of Art.7), Graham and Morrison, supra n.67 (no compelling circumstances, no violation of
Art.7), and Stephens, supra n.96 (severe beating, violation of Art.7).
139. Art.3 of the Torture Convention requires the existence of "substantial grounds for
believing that [a person] would be in danger of being subjected to torture". In the light of the
Committee's practice, the terms "danger" and "real risk" have been used to mean Die same.





145. Communication No.91/1997. This is an unusual case because the applicant was never
politically active, nor did he claim to be, and he had been lying about his identity and story.
The Committee nevertheless ruled that since the applicant had been tortured in the past (no
doubts existed that he had), he could be tortured again in view of his more recent activities.
It nevertheless refused to recognise such past persecution as sufficient evidence in l.A.O. v.
Sweden (Communication No.65/1997).
146. Communication No.101/1997.
147. Communication No.36/1995. His claim lacked substantiated evidence since he
claimed to have been maltreated only during his first detention, not his second, the periods
of detention had been very short, and there was no risk coming from the authorities.
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P.L. Q. v. Canada™* or E.A. v. Switzerland.1*9 In the latter, the Committee
recognised that the words "substantial grounds" in Article 3 "require
more than a mere possibility of torture but do not need to be highly likely
to occur" as contended by Switzerland.150 In assessing the existence of
"substantial grounds" and "danger", the Torture Committee relies on
written evidence as well as on oral statements.151 Its approach to such
assessment is quite unique in that "the existence in the State concerned of
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights"152 strengthens the findings of "substantial grounds", thus contribu-
ting to lowering the standard of proof. However, as repeatedly stated by
the Committee, it "does not as such constitute sufficient grounds".153
Information provided by non-governmental organisations and UN
agencies, as well its own country reports,154 constitute therefore crucial
sources of evidence.155 Other relevant considerations in the assessment of
"real risk" or "danger" include circumstances specific to the author (e.g.
ethnic background, political affiliation, detention history, desertion from
the army and internal exile) and particularities of the State to which he or
she is to be returned.156 Furthermore, the Torture Committee considers
that "even if there are doubts about the facts adduced by the author, it
must ensure that his security is not endangered".157 And in three further
cases, it took the clear view that "complete accuracy is seldom to be
expected by victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may exist
148. Supra n.14. The Committee considered that the "mere fact" that a person "would be
arrested and retried would not constitute substantial grounds for believing that he would be
in danger of being subjected to torture". Also, the author failed to demonstrate that he
would be personally at risk.
149. Communication No.28/1995, 10 Nov. 1997. The author failed to establish that he
would face a "foreseeable, real and personal risk" if returned to Turkey. See also G.R.B. v.
Sweden, supra n.98.
150. This was reaffirmed by the Committee in Aydm (supra n.146) in the following terms:
"the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable". Like the E.Ct H.R., the
Torture Committee requires more than a mere possibility of risk (VUvarajah, supra n.97).
151. Rule of Procedure 110, Torture Committee. Note that this is also the case for the
Strasbourg organs.
15Z Art.3(2), Torture Convention.
153. The Committee established this principle in Mutombo (supra n 20, at para.9.3). It was
confirmed in e.g. X. v. Netherlands (supra n.147) and Kisoki (supra n.142).
154. Alan, supra n.131.
155. In Valentijn (supra n.71), the Committee nevertheless made it clear that it would not
question the evaluation of the evidence made by the domestic courts, except in cases where
this assessment was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.
156. In Mutombo (supra n.20), for instance, the Committee recognised the fact that Zaire
was not a signatory of the Torture Convention to be a relevant factor in finding real risk.
And in Alan {supra n.131), its view was that although Turkey was a party to the Convention
and had recognised the Committee's competence to receive individual communications, this
did not necessarily constitute "sufficient guarantee" against refoulement. Finally, it
recognised that there was no safe area in Turkey for Mr Alan because his native place was
not safe and the police were looking for him.
157. Mutombo, supra n.20, at para.9.2.
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in the author's presentation of the facts are not material and do not raise
doubts about the general veracity of the author's claims".1'18
VII. CONCLUSION
STATES have a legal obligation to prevent the refoulement of refugees and
asylum-seekers; they must implement their duty in good faith through the
establishment of effective procedures for the determination of refugee
status. However, refugee law is limited to asylum-seekers and refugees
seeking protection with "clean hands". Hence the need to look for
protection against refoulement under human rights law. With the
exception of rejected asylum-seekers in Andorra, Albania and the United
Kingdom, who may seek protection only under the European Conven-
tion, asylum-seekers in Europe may alternatively choose to start proceed-
ings before one of the two UN Committees. The similarities between
these proceedings make it difficult to identify one clear winner among the
three instruments. However, this article reveals some discrepancies which
are worth taking into account before considering submitting a petition.
The Political Covenant stands out as the least suitable instrument.
Indeed, views of the Human Rights Committee in extradition cases reveal
no more than a restrictive application of the principles developed by the
Strasbourg organs. The shorter length of proceedings and the simplicity
of the views of this Committee may certainly count as an advantage but
this does not compensate for the restrictive use of evidence by the
Committee. In the long run, however, it is not excluded that the
Committee may gradually incorporate the principles held by the Stras-
bourg organs but, as things stand, reliance on the European Convention
or the Torture Convention seems to constitute a safer option. Both the
Strasbourg organs and the Torture Committee can claim a proven record
of successful applications and yet so many features distinguish one from
another. Among the factors playing in favour of petitioning the Torture
Committee, one may find the short length of proceedings, the absence of a
time limit for making a petition, and the almost total lack of formalism
with regard to making an application and with regard to the Committee's
views. Furthermore, the Torture Committee applies relaxed evidentiary
requirements. However, the Torture Convention limits the scope of
non-refoulement to cases of torture. In contrast, non-refoulement under
the European Convention extends to inhuman and degrading treatment,
whatever the source, but admissibility requirements are stringent and
every single one is strictly applied. In sum, the best option lies in
proceedings before the Strasbourg organs, provided particular effort is
158. Alan, supra n.131, at para. 113, Kisoki,supra n.\42, at para 9.3, and Tola,supra n. 143,
at para.103. Express reference was made in particular to paras.198-199 of the UNHCR
Handbook.
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put into the procedural requirements (i.e. formalism) and the presen-
tation of evidence.
Liberal recent developments in the application of Article 3 of the
European Convention by the Strasbourg organs must be welcome for at
least two reasons. First, they must be welcome for their direct impact on
the protection of asylum-seekers in Europe, by the Strasbourg organs
themselves but also by national courts. At least two recent cases
demonstrate that the right of States to expel has come under greater
scrutiny than ever before by human rights law. For instance, during 1997,
both the European Commission and the European Court of Human
Rights no longer had to deal with an application (by Mr Tilmatine against
the United Kingdom)159 and a case (Jorge A. Paez v. Sweden),1™
respectively, because a temporary residence permit had been granted by
the competent national authority. In both cases, the precedential value of
the principle held in the Soering case played a crucial role. The yardstick is
clearly international law, not national law. Second, the recent develop-
ments by the Strasbourg organs must be welcome for their impact on the
protection of asylum-seekers in other forums, as demonstrated by the
views of the Human Rights Committee and of the Torture Committee
considered in this article, which often embrace the European Court's
approach. In this sense, by reaching far beyond the limits of its own
decisions and jurisdiction, the work of the Strasbourg organs on
non-refoulement is of a norm-creating character.
159. Supra n.16. See also Raguz {supra n.108).
160. Reports of Judg. and Dec. (1997-VII) no. 56.
